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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as connected sensors are increasingly being used in the public sector, often
deployed and collecting data in public spaces. A theme commonly seen in the rhetoric surrounding public space IoT
initiatives is empowerment, and these deployments are broadly perceived as beneficial by policy makers. However,
such technology presents new governance challenges. It is important to ask who is empowered and who benefits, and
we must ensure that such technological interventions follow democratic principles and are trusted by citizens. In this
paper, we investigate how risk, transparency, and data governance require careful consideration in this domain,
describing work which investigates how these combine to form components of trusted IoTecosystems. This includes
an overview of the landscape of public space IoT deployments, consideration of how they may often be subsumed in
idealized smart city focused rhetoric, and discussion of how methodologies such as design fiction in community
settings can uncover potential risks and concerns. Our findings suggest that agency, value and intent associated with
IoT systems are key components that must be made transparent, particularly when multiple actors and stakeholders
are involved. We suggest that good governance requires consideration of these systems in their entirety, throughout
the full planning, implementation, and evaluation process, and in consultation with multiple stakeholders who are
impacted, including the public. To achieve this effectively, we argue for transparency at the device and system level,
which may require legislative change.
Policy Significance Statement
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which collect and share data, increasingly fill our environment. Ubiquitous data
collection has great potential benefits, and these technologies frequently form a component of “smart city”
programs favored by policymakers. However, important questions of privacy and data management must also be
considered when introducing these technologies into public spaces. Many different groups may be affected by
these deployments, and the needs of each must be considered. This article considers how transparency and
effective governance can facilitate greater interrogation of public IoT deployments, key for developing more
trustworthy IoT ecosystems. It highlights that policy and regulation are important at multiple scales; national,
regional, and local, as well as at the level of the technology systems themselves.
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Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a major growth area with significant economic and social implications
(OECD, 2015). The term was coined by Kevin Ashton in the late 1990s to describe the collecting and
sharing of supply chain data without direct human intervention (Ashton, 2009), and has come to be used
more expansively to include a wide range of spatially distributed devices that collect and transmit data. It
has been claimed that there may be 20 billion such connected devices by 2020 (Gartner, 2017).
Increasingly, these technologies are not just being used in private contexts, but also in public ones.
Device deployments may be undertaken by public sector organizations to gather data for civic purposes,
activities which are often discussed alongside rhetoric of the “smart city” (Kitchin, 2014). Examples of
such activities and purposes might include the use of temperature, humidity, and CO2 sensors within
social housing (Davidson, 2018) to monitor aspects such as occupancy, damp, and potentially even
complex issues such as fuel poverty. Sensors and devices may also be installed in shared public spaces
such as smart lighting, traffic management, or digitally controlled utility services. Public sector deploy-
ments in these spaces join those undertaken by individuals, industry, third sector organizations, or a
combination, for example, the multi-partner “Chicago Array of Things” project, led by an academic team
(Jacobs et al., 2020). Public bodies might also seek to install or legislate for devices in private or semi-
private spaces, such as the UK’s smart meter initiative in the energy sector (Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016). This move toward technology as infrastructure requires new policy
and regulation. Instrumentation of public and shared environments using IoT technologies introduces new
complexities of data governance, privacy, and security, given the large volumes of data collected,
involvement of multiple actors and stakeholders, the distribution across physical space, and questions
of accountability at a variety of stages including procurement, deployment, and management. For
example, collecting large volumes of data has the potential to compromise privacy, particularly if personal
data is included or can be inferred by linking a variety of data sources (Urquhart et al., 2019).
A theme commonly linked with smart cities, and more specifically public space IoT initiatives, is
empowerment. Laced with articulations of enhanced democracy and openness, many IoT projects
initiated by or carried out in the public sector are couched in language of increased efficiencies for
overworked (often urban) infrastructure, economic benefits for citizens and users, the stimulation and
vitalization of new markets, and the positive social impact of digital-led innovations on the community
(e.g., Walport, 2014; Gunashekar et al., 2016). It is, however, important to consider how this vision of
digital opportunity and enrichment might be experienced by all social actors; not just those involved in
leading these initiatives but those impacted, directly and indirectly, within the community and at all levels.
In this commentary, we report on work examining the governance at the national and local levels of
public space IoT deployments and associated data capture, and explore whose visions contribute to
developing these articulations of empowerment, as well as questions of value generated by such
deployments and where this value might be located. Given that such data capture may have associated
risks and challenges unforeseen by those governing and implementing it, we argue that factors such as
transparency and accountability are crucial in protecting the rights of the public, and are important in
ensuring the trustworthiness of IoT deployments. In exploring these questions, we build on work of the
EPSRC-funded TrustLens1 project, which considers how these visions of digital opportunity and
enrichment might be experienced by all social actors; not just those involved in leading the initiatives
but those impacted, directly and indirectly, within the community where IoT solutions are deployed. If
data collected via the initiatives are of value, who receives benefit, either financial or otherwise, from this
collection? Who might be at risk? The ultimate goal of the project is to understand and enable trusted IoT
ecosystems, from the perspective of those impacted by such systems. With such challenges exposed, we
argue that designing and implementing such systems requires associated design of policy and governance
that is informed by the needs of multiple stakeholders within these complex systems.
1 https://trustlens.wordpress.com
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Examining the Landscape
It is difficult to discuss public space IoT in an urban context without reference to the smart city. In our
work, examining the landscape of public space IoT funding and development, focusing particularly on the
UnitedKingdom,we have observed that there is often pressure on local authorities to transform cities with
technology and conform to positive rhetoric which assumes that benefit will automatically ensue. In this
sense, one answer to the question “who trusts in the smart city?” might be that local authorities trust in
smart cities to provide promised solutions and benefits. Technology solutions may be proposed by
commercial providers or put out to tender by public bodies to solve a specific problem, endorsed by those
who wish to improve services. However, procurers are not necessarily familiar with the details of the
technology and its privacy and security implications.Materials produced by technology providers, as well
as public sector strategy documents, often contain promises of efficiency savings and assumptions of
upcoming ubiquity without dwelling on the challenges of these implementations. While there is a
multiplicity of smart city exemplars and demonstrators, we found that information sharing between
regions and authorities is often limited, with little communication of either best practice, or challenges that
were encountered. This concurs with the “self-congratulatory” trend described by Hollands (2008).
Though the smart city term is increasingly used by policymakers, industry and the media, many have
expressed concern that it is nonspecific and of limited use (Hollands, 2008; Angelidou, 2014; Kitchin,
2014). Angelidou notes that there remains no agreed definition of smart (or intelligent) cities. Kitchin
(2014), p. 2 suggests that it encompasses two distinct but related concepts: either the implementation of
ubiquitous computing and digitally instrumented devices into the fabric of urban environments, or the
broader development of a knowledge economy within a city region, a city “whose economy and
governance is being driven by innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship, enacted by smart people”.
This linkage between solutions that develop the knowledge economy and those that use IoT technology
seems in some cases to be taken for granted. Many of those who discuss the implementation of smart
cities, including policymakers, public representatives, and technology providers, focus primarily on how
digital and data-driven solutions can offer significant economic and social value. (e.g., Hill et al., 2016;
Future Cities Catapult, 2017). This optimistic and somewhat reductionist approach suggests that being
able to gather data will necessarily lead to solutions (Hollands, 2015). However, this is not necessarily the
case and in this sense unconditional trust in the positive consequences of smart cities is perhapsmisplaced.
A particular question highlighted by our research is the complex nature of privacy and trust when data
is collected in public spaces. It is not always possible to foresee all potential risks of data collection,
particularly whenmultiple datasets exist andmay be combined. In some cases, it seems that the strategy of
those initiating the deployments is to obtain as much data as possible and decide what to use it for later.
This seems to be in contravention of the ideals of data protection legislation such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)2, which requires a clear purpose for data collection. However, this is
complicated by the fact that much of this is environmental or situational data and considered nonpersonal.
In implementing solutions that are designed for public benefit, it is important to consider risks that may
be encountered with widespread data collection in public spaces, which can also be seen as a form of
surveillance (Vagle, 2016). Because some of these programs are supplementing existing infrastructure,
extensive public consultation is not always considered to be necessary. For example, while conducting
ethnographic work in our community of interest, local residents queried the purpose of a new item of street
furniture with no clear purpose or visible signage indicating who to contact for further information. This
device-equipped street bollard uses sensors to monitor cycle and pedestrian traffic to inform transport
planning, a function that would previously have been undertaken more sporadically through other means.
This functionality facilitates transport management, but the installation occurred with limited transpar-
ency (a press release gave details of the initiative but was not widely distributed) precipitating trust issues
within the community.While this particular deployment does not collect personal information, the generic
device housing used could potentially have included a far greater range of sensors, without any visible
difference (Figure 1).
2 https://eugdpr.org/
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Speculative Methods for Understanding Opportunities and Risk
The bollard described above caused concern in our community of interest, those resident in the Tillydrone
region of Aberdeen. Tillydrone is known to have “a multiplicity of personal and social needs which
exclude socially and economically disadvantaged residents from integration in the local community”
(Lighthouse, 2018). This region has been designated as a regeneration area by the local council and there
have been multiple interventions to benefit citizens and address social needs. Such marginalized
communities are not always beneficiaries from new technology implementation (Gurstein, 2011). When
asking “who trusts in the smart city,” the types of people who come to mind as being within the smart city
ecosystem (and therefore having varied levels of trust) may not be inclusive of those who live in places
such as Tillydrone. In our initial context-building work, we found that the trust relationship between the
community and the local government is multifaceted, with some residents indicating that aspects of the
relationship in the past, such as poor management of expectations, have led to mistrust. It may be
challenging for such communities to have trust in IoT technologies implemented as part of transforming
their environment to a smart citywhen there is not an assumption of trust in public service provision before
the city becomes smart.
The issue in the case of the bollard was not the deployment itself, which had a clear benefit and benign
purpose, but the lack of transparency, which meant that the public did not have the information necessary
to ensure trust. In order to properly interrogate IoTsystemswhich are being deployed in public spaces, it is
important for these systems to be transparent. This involves both transparency of the governance
processes that has led to their implementation, and for the systems and devices within them to have
transparency of function; that it is possible and easy to find out and understand what the devices are
intended to do, what they actually do and where accountability lies.
As previously mentioned, there are significant challenges to considering the future implications of
such novel systems and solutions that involve a wide range of stakeholders and contexts. We suggest that
Figure 1. Sensor enabled pedestrian and cycle tracker.
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when considering the design and deployment of such systems it is necessary to incorporate new
speculative methods which enable the development of new understanding. This can thus feed into the
design of appropriate policy and can keep pace with fast-moving new solutions. In a series of workshops
with members of the Tillydrone community and local service providers, we used a design fiction
methodology to interrogate questions on topics such as data privacy, data governance, risk, and trust
that may arise through the introduction of public space IoT deployments. Design fiction involves the
design of “diagetic prototypes” (Bosch, 2012): tangible objects which are created to depict fictional futures
or alternate presents. In this case, the design fictions represented a version of Tillydrone in which IoT
deployments are being deployed as part of public infrastructure, specifically three different scenarios of
waste management using distributed IoTsolutions with associated design fiction prototype objects. Each of
these acted as an “entry point” to aworldbuilding scenario constructed by the project team. For example, one
scenario envisioned the use of smart waste bins deployed by the local council in residential high-rise
buildings, which residents would access through use of a contactless smart card. Materials presented
to workshop participants included said card, information leaflets from the council which explained the
function of the bins, and a letter to residents informing them of the roll-out process. What was not
represented in these materials, despite being developed as part of the scenario, was the data flow (i.e., the
nature of data collected and how it moved through various parts of the system) and governance (e.g., actors
involved, decision-making processes, and intent). This included, for example, the detail that bins were
purchased by the council froma commercial company, “BinTech,”whoprovided access to resulting data via
a management dashboard, but retained ownership. This additional information was presented in the form of
data management maps at a later stage of the workshop, and was of some surprise to the participants who
often found it did not match their initial assumptions.
By presenting materials representative of the usual levels of public communication around such
deployments (e.g., press releases and informational leaflets) we aimed to examine the frequent lack of
transparency evident in these systems and the misunderstandings and assumptions which might therefore
take place Figure 2.
Transparency and Agency
When initially presenting our scenarios and objects to the participants, we found a range of attitudes
towards these technological solutions. Many participants were initially positive when introduced to these
technologies, which were designed to solve community challenges such as littering and waste manage-
ment. However, the workshop questions prompted participants to question aspects such as privacy and
value, and to consider more carefully the identity of the various actors involved, the nature of the data
Figure 2. Design fiction materials.
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collected and, when revealed, the data management pathways. Through this process they highlighted
potential risks which had not previously been considered and were more cautious about their approval for
such deployments. By talking through aspects of the systems and receiving prompts regarding aspects
such as data management and governance, various potential risks emergedwhich they had not considered
at the outset. Many participant concerns related to issues of transparency and agency. Although there was
no immediate distrust of the deployments, or those putting them in place, there was concern over the idea
that they may be happening without residents’ knowledge or opportunity for input. One participant
commented: “It doesn’t look like they asked anybody—the council are saying, we’re doing this.” No
opportunities were presented for opting out of a deployment that could potentially have implications for
the lives of residents.
This notion of agency was recurrent, particularly given that some of the design fiction scenarios
included devices that gathered data from passers-by and would be deployed in public spaces. The
participants noted that it may not be possible to opt out of such a system, particularly if deployed in a
place that you move through frequently, or in which you are not aware of its presence at all due to lack of
appropriate notification materials such as signage. Participants also raised concerns relating to data
collection andmanagement.When prompted to consider what datamight be collected by such devices and
deployments, participants began to question not only the specific details of data collected, but the intent
behind it and who migh benefit from its use. Financial benefit from the selling of data was not seen as
necessarily detrimental as long as privacy was protected, but ownership was a topic of discussion, for
example, with one participant suggesting that any revenue generated should be reinvested into the
community.
Participants were keen to know details of the deployments, their purpose, and what was happening to
the resulting data collected through the use of such technology interventions. Key data management
questions included knowing not only what data are being collected, but also why the deployment
happened, who is collecting data, and who designed and manages the system as a whole. Additionally,
some queries concerned the storage and security of the data, askingwhere it was being sent and stored, and
who had ownership of it. Again, it was felt that if there was value in the data, this should be shared by the
community, for example by giving the community access to data on public space usage in order to “inform
action and generate ideas” on how to better support the community.
Throughout the responses to the design fictions, participants demonstrated a desire for transparency
and communication to the public. Furthermore, they reinforced the view that communication should be in
a form that is accessible; using “plain English” and preferably with support for questions to be answered.
“If this is being introduced in the community you need someone to come along to introduce it, to tell
you its capabilities, answer all the questions you’ve got about it”
Policy at Multiple Scales
The findings above demonstrate that transparency is desirable for those who may be encountering IoT
deployments in their environments. To provide transparency requires that considerations of privacy and
data management are understood by those implementing the systems. This also enables transparency of
processes between regional programs to share learning and avoid repetition of costly mistakes.
At the local level, deployments can be initiated by a range of different actors, including public sector
bodies, commercial companies, or ground-up citizen-led initiatives. There may be different consider-
ations of data management and privacy, surveillance, and value depending onwho these actors are and the
motivation and intent of the deployment. It is important that transparent governance processes are in place
and citizens can identify the actors involved, for example by publishing detailed but clear privacy and data
ownership policies that inform the public about their rights.
At the system level, the technical specifications of the devices must similarly be transparent so that
features of data collection, storage, and transfer can be audited and made accountable. Design decisions
must be taken that are conscious of potential risks, and efforts must be taken to mitigate them. Principles
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such as privacy by design and default that incorporate such values throughout the development process
can form a key part of this. Organizations purchasing IoT sensor enabled devices must be able to both
determine and communicate what data are collected and shared, how this creates value, and who benefits.
By considering the system in its entirety at the outset, factoring in the position of and benefits to all
stakeholders including citizens, public sector organizations, and commercial technology providers,
potential privacy, and security risks can be identified in advance and appropriate choices made. Enforcing
approaches such as privacy by design is not only good practice for protecting privacy, but encourages
greater efficiency, avoiding preventable issues which may require costly fixes, for example, creating new
software, hardware, or policy.
Regulation must also be implemented to ensure that positive value does not come at the expense of the
rights or safety of citizens. It is for this reason that the introduction of legislation such as the GDPR and
technology standards are important; however, we argue that such systems and their processes must also be
transparent and consider the needs of multiple stakeholders at various levels. It is important that
governance and regulation should be ongoing processes rather than something implemented only once,
particularly when IoT technologies are rapidly developing.
Conclusion
At the regional, national, or super-national level, we have observed that the use of smart technologies to
support infrastructure is generally perceived in ideologically positive terms (Hollands, 2015) and is highly
encouraged by policy (Jacobs et al., 2020). However, if data collected via smart city and related public
space IoT initiatives are of value, we must consider to whom it is of value; who receives benefit, either
financial or otherwise from its collection; and who might be at risk. Additional questions should be asked
regarding whose rights are being enhanced, exploited, or empowered and who is responsible when
something goes wrong. When planning and implementing these deployments, actors involved must
consider governance and policy at a variety of scales and ask wider questions not only about data
management, but also how decisionmaking will affect multiple stakeholders whomight be impacted. It is
important to ask such questions at the start of the process and as data are being collected. Furthermore, it
is also important to consider why data needs to be collected at all, rather than just collecting it because it is
there with usefulness to be decided later. We have seen that assumptions can be made that connected
technology is beneficial and helps people butwith sometimes limited consideration of the associated risks,
some of which may not become apparent until details of deployments are more closely interrogated.
In this work, we highlight transparency and communication as critical; in order to be able to trust in the
smart city, people need to be informed about deployments as they occur, and any associated risks.
Deciding on the best way to include the public may not be straightforward, as information must be
intelligible and comprehensible to a wide range of stakeholders. Through the work of the TrustLens
project we are developing tools to help different actors consider key aspects of public space IoT
deployments. For example, a digital and physical “card deck” presents questions covering multiple
aspects of the deployment process, and asks different stakeholders to consider whether they have answers
immediately available, or need to conduct further scoping and research. Such tools encourage public
sector bodies who are considering IoT solutions to be deliberative in their deployment and in their choice
of how tomanage the data generated. Guidance for individuals and communities will aid in the facilitation
of transparency and assist in gaining access to information that they may otherwise not realize might be
necessary.
We also recommend that detailed policy guidelines and regulation should be used to prevent the use of
inappropriate technology solutions which may entail risk to citizens or organizations. There is a need for
transparency at the device and system level, and associated regulation to ensure this. Tenders to public
organizations must ensure IoT solutions meet minimum standards which mitigate risks; for example,
tracking data provenance to allow interrogation of data ownership and associated accountability. Tools
such as those described above aim to encourage mindfulness of these considerations during the planning,
Data & Policy e11-7
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 22 Jul 2020 at 10:17:16, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
implementation, communication, and evaluation processes; however, this must form part of a wider move
toward an ethos of greater transparency.
It is important to emphasize that we do not suggest IoT technologies associated with smart city rhetoric
are not beneficial, nor that the public sector organizations who implement them are not sincere about
improving the lives of citizens. However, in order for individuals and communities to be able to place trust
in public sector IoT deployments, there must be transparency regarding the functionality, origins, and
risks entailed. The technologies must be properly implemented and the significant challenges of privacy
and governance, particularly with respect to data sharing and ownership, must be fully addressed.
Meaningful accountability to and protection of the public must be incorporated into the new norms of
technology as a facet of public service provision, in order for data to add value and enhance the rights to all
of society, rather than just a particular section of it.
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